Assad is here to stay and Russian influence has prevailed.
Reviewed in the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs by David Sultan, former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt.
What was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s attitude toward Israel? Did it change as a result of his country’s stunning defeat in the Six-Day War? Was the Egyptian president willing to achieve a political settlement with Israel? Did Israel miss an opportunity to reach an agreement with Nasser? These are some of the questions with which historians and political commentators have been grappling for decades, while offering views that differ in terms of nuance, or more fundamentally, from the canonical version of events.
Published in the Washington Post.
They have acted in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative, also known as the Saudi peace plan, which called on the Arab League to terminate belligerency with Israel. It also envisioned a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel in exchange for Israel withdrawing to the June 4, 1967 lines and agreeing to “a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem” that accorded with “UN General Assembly Resolution 194 while rejecting all forms of patriation.”
Published in Foreign Policy Research Institute.
The Kingdom of Jordan relies on American support to prevent terrorist infiltration from Islamic State and other Salafi-Jihadist threats; alleviate the economic burden strained by a massive influx of Syrian refugees; and achieve a diplomatic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The U.S. perceives Jordan as a strategic partner—an island of stability in an unstable region. In 2016, Jordan received $1.4 billion in economic and military assistance from the United States. This aid is part of a three-year memorandum of understanding whereby Washington will allocate $1 billion in aid to Jordan annually, up from $660 million in recent years. As a result of Jordan’s unique geostrategic position, the U.S. has refrained from publicly critiquing its human rights abuses.
Published in The Times of Israel by Sheldon Kirshner, a Toronto-based journalist.
Egypt’s crushing defeat at the hands of Israel in the Six Day War created a crisis of confidence in the Egyptian government. Bouncing back from the depths of despair, President Gamal Abdel Nasser reacted to Israel’s victory by political and military means.
In Nasser’s Peace: Egypt’s Response to the 1967 War With Israel (Transaction Publishers), Michael Sharnoff, drawing on recently declassified primary sources, expertly examines his policies before and after that seminal conflict.
Gamal Abdel Nasser was arguably one of the most influential Arab leaders in history. As President of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, he could have achieved a peace agreement with Israel, yet he preferred to maintain his unique leadership role by affirming pan-Arab nationalism and championing the liberation of Palestine, a common euphemism for the destruction of Israel.
Drawing on recently declassified primary sources, Michael Sharnoff thoroughly inspects Nasser’s post-war strategy, which he claims was a four-tiered diplomatic and media effort consisting of his public declarations, his private diplomatic consultations, the Egyptian media’s propaganda machine, and Egyptian diplomatic efforts. Nasser manipulated each tier masterfully, providing the answers they desired to hear, rather than stating the truth: that he wished to maintain control of his dictatorship and of his foothold in the Arab world.
Published in the Jewish Chronicle.
During the 1950s and 60s, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser guided and shaped Arab public opinion.
Nasser emerged as the undisputed leader of the Arab world by championing pan-Arabism — a secular ideology that advocated Arab unity and freedom from Western influence. It also championed the liberation of Palestine, a euphemism for the creation of a Palestinian Arab state on the ruins of Israel.